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The First Amendment and the Judicial Process:
A Reply to Mr. Frantz
Wallace Mendelson*
The author continues a debate with Mr. Laurent Frantz on the
meaning of the first amendment and the "balancing of interests" in free
speech cases. He suggests that every judicial decision involves a
balancing approach, and concludes that it is desirable that this balancing
be clearly articulated.
In a wide-ranging debate, Mr. Laurent Frantz and I have singled
out two key issues on which we-and perhaps activists and anti-
activists generally-axe divided.' One concerns the meaning of the
first amendment; the other the "balancing of interests" in free utterance
cases.
THE MEANING OF THE FiRST AMENDmENT
To come at once to the heart of the problem: Mr. Frantz assumes
that the first amendment incorporates Meildejoim's book, Political
Freedom.2 This wise little study suggests that
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass
judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger.... Just so far as,
at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance
with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is
relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced
planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process
of the community against which the First Amendment ... is directed.3
Surely no one dedicated to democracy and human decency could fail
to find inspiration in these words. But philosophy is one thing, and
history another. Dean Levy and others have shown that at best (in
the libertarian view) the historic meaning of free utterance is found
in Blackstone.4 In short it permitted prosecution for seditious libel.
*Professor of Government, University of Texas.
1. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendel-
son, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L.
REv. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CALI=. L. BEv. 729 (1963).
2. Id. at 735. See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 878, 916 (1963).
3. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLTCAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
4. LEVY, LEGAcY OF SUPPaPsSION (1960). For further evidence, see Mendelson,
supra note 1, at 822-24.
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This view stands unrefuted; even Chafee ultimately accepted it.5 Mr.
Justice Iredell-appointed to the Supreme Court by President Wash-
ington-gave the gist of the matter in charging a grand jury with
respect to the Sedition Act of 1798:
That objection is, that the act is in violation of this amendment of the
Constitution.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances."
The question then is, whether this law has abridged the freedom of the
press?
Here is a remarkable difference in expressions as to the different objects
in the same clause. They are to make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press. When, as to one object, they entirely prohibit
any act whatever, and, as to another object, only limit the exercise of the
power, they must, in reason, be supposed to mean different things. I
presume, therefore, that Congress may make a law respecting the press,
provided the law be such as not to abridge its freedom. What might be
deemed the freedom of the press, if it had been a new subject, and never
before in discussion, might indeed admit of some controversy. But, so far
as precedent, habit, laws, and practices are concerned, there can scarcely
be a more definite meaning than that which all these have affixed to the
term in question.6
It is believed that, in every State in the Union, the common law
principles concerning libels apply; and in some of the States words similar
to the words of the Amendment are used in the Constitution itself, or a
contemporary Bill of Rights, of equal authority, without ever being sup-
posed to exclude any law being passed on the subject. So that there is the
strongest proof that can be of a universal concurrence in America on this
point, that the freedom of the press does not require that libellers shall be
protected from punishment.7
Of course, we are not inevitably obliged to honor the purposes of
those who gave us the Bill of Rights. What then of judicial precedent?
I suggest that in first amendment cases pure and simple no decision
of the Supreme Court goes beyond Blackstone (though perhaps some
of its language does). Indeed, no act of Congress has ever been held
invalid on first amendment grounds.
What kind of law is it that was never enacted by the political
processes, nor adopted by the judges? By what authority does Mr.
Frantz get Mr. Meiklejohn into the First Amendment? Both history
5. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HAnv. L. REv. 891 (1949).
6. See WnAnTON, STA TnEAs OF Tm UNrx STATEs DunnG =E ADmInsTRAO N
OF WAsHNGTON AND AA. s 477-78 (1849). For a similar view see the Report of a
House Committee, 38 ANNJs OF CONc., 5th Cong., 3d Sess. 2985-93 (1799).
7. WHrARToN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 479.
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and judicial precedent (federal and state) are overwhelmingly against
him-to say nothing of the other agencies of government. And surely
he can claim no social support remotely comparable to the forces that
put Herbert Spencer's Social Statics into the fourteenth amendment.
Law cannot support itself by its own bootstraps, or thrive on the
dreams of a few idealists. Moreover, even so ardent a libertarian-and
so competent a lawyer-as Chafee found Meiklejohn's approach
judicially unworkable.
Of course, on his philosophic premise much of what Mr. Frantz
says would have to be accepted. And only on that premise can he ask
such paradoxical questions as "Is the First Amendment Law?," and
why does the Court not enforce it?9 The answer is that the amend-
ment is law, and (insofar as it goes) is judicially enforced. It is
Meildejohn's book that is not law and not enforced.
In effect Mr. Frantz is chiding the Court for not legislating Meilde-
john into, and something else out of, the Constitution. This, perhaps,
a court may do when it "feels behind it the weight of such general
acceptance as will give sanction to its pretension to unquestioned
dictation."10 Meanwhile, "it must be content to lag behind the best
inspiration of its time"-as reflected in men like Alexander Meildejohn."
BAINcNG AND FREEDOM
Mr. Frantz rejects the "balancing of interests" as a general approach
in utterance cases. He let go of the cat when he confessed about
Meildejohn. I now confess that (except perhaps in simple cases which
seldom reach the Supreme Court) balancing seems to me the essence
of the judicial process-the nexus between abstract law and concrete
life. Lawmakers cannot anticipate all the combinations and permuta-
tions of circumstance. What Cardozo called "the great generalities of
the Constitution" are no more amenable to mechanistic application by
liberals than they were by Mr. Justice Roberts in his famous squaring
analogy.'2 Moreover, balancing would seem to be implicit in an ad-
versary system which inevitably contemplates at least two sides to
every case-the lopsided ones being weeded out in law offices and
the lower courts. As T. R. Powell observed long ago, "It will ever
remain a mystery to me how intelligent jurists can make.., professions
of nonparticipation in the judicial process." 13 Surely the choice is
8. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HRv. L. BEv. 891 (1949).
9. FRANrZ, supra note 1, 51 CALIw. L. REv. at 738.
10. HAND, THE SP=nn OF LmERTY 15-16 (2d ed. Dilliard 1953).
11. Id. at 15.
12. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
13. POWELL, VAGAIFS AND VARES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPBRETATION 28
(1956).
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simply this: shall the balancing be done "intuitively" or rationally;
covertly or out in the open? Of course, it should always be done in the
light of accepted legal principles14-and obviously the light of Meilde-
john is quite different from that of Blackstone.
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania'5 is a classic example of covert, and proba-
bly "intuitive," balancing. There the old Court held invalid a state
regulation of commerce as a "direct burden"-and that is virtually all
there was in the opinion. No observer could tell what interests were
weighed against what. Ostensibly the Court merely applied a well-
known rule of law. But who outside the Court could know, and thus
appraise, the decisive considerations that marked the burden in ques-
tion as "direct" rather than "indirect"? Mr. Justice Stone, joined by
Holmes and Brandeis, observed in dissent:
In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring
whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me
to be too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from
actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions, "direct"
and "indirect interference" with commerce, we are doing little more than
using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by
which it is reached.16
What a world of difference between the Court's approach in Di
Santo, and its approach in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona' 7 There
Stone gave the positive side of his earlier dissent, revealing in detail
factors considered on each side of the judicial scale. Appraisal of the
process could then proceed rationally. Perhaps even more important,
the open balancing operation itself tends to focus the attention of all
concerned on actualities and away from the never-never land of pri-
vate, and perhaps unconscious, preconceptions.'8
14. How much weight should be given to congressional judgment is another matter.
Apparently modem, overt balancers find that the step from a general and ancient con-
stitutional precept to the problems of modem life is largely legislative. Hence, pre-
sumably, their special deference (via the reasonable man approach) for legislative
policy. Learned Hand put it briefly: "If a court be really candid, it can only say: 'We
find that this measure will have this result; it will injure this group in such and such
ways, and benefit that group in these other ways. We declare it invalid, because after
every conceivable allowance for differences of outlook, we cannot see how a fair per-
son can honestly believe that the benefits balance the losses."' HAND, THE Spnmrr o
LmERTv 179 (2d ed. Dillard 1953).
15. 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
16. Id. at 44.
17. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
18. It is noteworthy that Mr. Justice Black, who in first amendment cases believes in
absolutes and repudiates balancing (see Konigsberg v. California, 366 U.S. 36, 65-76
(1962); Calm, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 (1962)), dissented in Southern Pacific. There too he repudiated
the Court's balancing technique, and thought the case should have been decided by
an absolute rule which the Court had never accepted as law.
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It seems a fair guess that if in Di Santo the Court had felt com-
pelled to reveal the ingredients of its decision, there would have been
less Herbert Spencer in the scales, and more of the real-life considera-
tions mentioned in the Brandeis dissent. In short, the Court might
have been compelled either to reach a different result, or reveal for all
to see a vulnerable exercise in the accommodation of law and life.
Mr. Frantz does not like the balancing that occurred in Barenblatt.19
The Court could easily have reached the same result via the Di Santo
route. But in balancing openly, it gave Mr. Frantz an opportunity for
reasoned criticism of the proffered weighing process. The Di Santo
technique hides the inevitable balancing behind a verbal, and often
Platonic, barrier. Strictly followed, it means a Mr. Frantz must argue
that the burden on commerce "taint," while the Court holds "'tis,"
direct (whatever that means). Our debt to Holmes, Brandeis, and
Stone is that they cut through the net of formality, and encouraged us
to "think things, not words." This, I believe, is the crux of the open
balancing approach. It is not foolproof and certainly will not make a
great judge of a little man. But it offers hope of progress for inquiring
minds. What Walter Lippmann said in another context is relevant
here: "When men act on the principle of intelligence, they go out to
find the facts.... When they ignore it, they go inside themselves and
find only what is there. They elaborate their prejudice instead of in-
creasing their knowledge."
Dean Griswold has suggested that the balancing approach is mis-
named, that it might better be called the "comprehensive" or "integral"
approach.
Instead of focusing on a few words, and ignoring all else, including the
effect and meaning of those words, as distinguished from their apparent
impact when isolated from everything else ... the comprehensive or integral
approach accepts the task of the judge as one which involves the effect of
all the provisions of the Constitution, not merely in a narrow literal sense,
but in a living, organic sense, including the elaborate and complex govem-
mental structure which the Constitution, through its words, has erected.20,
In any event, the essence of balancing is realism-a repudiation of
the modem activists' rhetorical, or magic phrase, technique. The latter
characteristically begins with an honored phrase or doctrine-the clear,
and present danger rule, for example; knocks the brains out of it, by
stretching it so broadly as to deprive it of any ascertainable meaning;
21-
and then uses it in talismanic fashion to "resolve" all manner of difficul-
19. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Frantz, supra note 1, 51
CAIF. L. REv, at 746.
20. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 172 (1963).
21. See Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLum-
L. REv. 313, 317 (1952).
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ties-from non-utterance by moppets in their classroomsm to trial by
newspaper m to a struggle between lunatic fringe hate groups for
what Hitler called "the conquest of the streets." 4 Paul Freund gave
the epitaph for this cycle of activist word-play when he wrote
No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase "clear and present danger," or
how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the
weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what
is most certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedom which
the judge must disentangle 2s
Or, as Mr. Justice Jackson observed in the Terminiello case (after his
conversion at Nuremberg), the activists reverse
this conviction by reiterating generalized approbations of freedom of speech
with which, in the abstract, no one will disagree. Doubts as to their
applicability are lulled by avoidance of more than passing reference to
the circumstances of Terminiello's speech and judging it as if he had spoken
to persons as dispassionate as empty benches, or like a modem Demosthenes
practicing his Philippics on a lonely seashore.26
Cut loose from its foundation in the distinction between discussion
and incitement, the clear and present danger test lost its rational
meaning and became a cloak for "vague but fervent transcendental-
ism."2 7 In short, the activists destroyed it as an intelligible guide to
decision-and then abandoned it about a dozen years ago.28 Mean-
while they have tried, and apparently discarded, one "new" verbalism
after another. The latest is Mr. Justice Black's absolutist concentration
on two untroubled words in the first amendment: "no law."29 This
gambit-"no law means no law"-again begs all the difficulties simply
by ignoring them. As Dean Griswold has suggested, it reminds one
of the fundamentalist church sign which proclaimed, "God said it.
We believe it. That's all there is to it."30
CONCLUSION
The need for judicial balancing, I suggest, results from the imper-
fection of mundane law. In a better world, no doubt, clear and precise
legal rules would anticipate all possible contingencies. No wonder,
22. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
23. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
24. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
25. FxumND, ON UNDERsTANDiNr =n SuPremz CouRTr 27-28 (1949).
26. 337 U.S. at 13.
27. Mendelson, supra note 21, at 322.
28. Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-Another Decade, 39 TEXAs L. RBv. 449
(1961).
29. Cahn, supra note 18.
30. Griswold, supra note 20, at 172.
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then, that idealists are impatient with the balancing process. Mr.
Frantz" solution has a familiar ring. He suggests that law precedes,
and apparently even transcends, politics.3' Here is our old friend "the
brooding omnipresence"--"the higher law"-that Holmes and Brandeis
among others fought so hard to kill. Surely in a democracy law is a
creature of the political processes, constitutional and legislative. Judges,
of course, cannot avoid legislating in some degree, but to repeat
Holmes' much quoted phrase they must do so only interstitially-lest
they rather than the people govern. For judges now to treat Meikle-
john's book as "higher law" seems at least as far from mere gap-
filling as was their predecessors' treatment of Herbert Spencer.
If libertarians are convinced that the Court is wrong, and that
Meildejohn's views reflect the community consensus, surely a con-
stitutional amendment would be a feasible and proper remedy. If
there is no such consensus, how could we justify imposing a minority
view upon the people? The old Court tried that in the 1930s and de-
stroyed itself. Obviously most of the "nine old men" and their sup-
porters were just as certain as libertarians are today that their values
were "fundamental" and indeed indispensable to freedom-as well as
inherent in "higher law." Holmes' answer was that "certitude is not
the test of certainty."32 Another response was the Brandeis brief with
its invitation to open balancing as a substitute for word-play and
Platonic abstraction in court opinions.
I end where I began, amused yet troubled by the continuing ac-
tivist-idealist pretense that all answers to all problems are in (or
above) the Constitution-and that the judicial process for extracting
them is largely mechanical or automatic.
31. Frantz, supra note 1, 51 CALW. L. REv. at 754.
32. HoLxm, Natural Law, in CoLLCE LEGAL PAPERS 310, 311 (1920).

